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Abstract
A central role for economic policy involves understanding and reducing the impact of unex-
pected, extreme events. In this paper, we develop a simple economic framework with latent
regime switches. This framework explains why investors and policymakers can decide not to
hedge against extreme events, even those that are exogenous, with well understood probabil-
ities and consequences. We also examine endogenous probabilities, where the consequences
are less well understood. Our most striking ﬁnding is that the beneﬁts of sustained optimal
investment are bounded and small. Thus, investors may knowingly ignore or exacerbate the
likelihood of extreme events, especially if there are informational costs to learning the structure
of the ﬁnancial environment. We also discover that the beneﬁts of leverage represent a large
percentage of income. These results obtain both in the theoretical model and upon calibration
to the last half-century of US economic experience.
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markedsfondet Grant # 185339.1 Introduction and motivation
”We all learn by experience, and your lesson this time is that you should never lose
sight of the alternative.” Sherlock Holmes: The Adventure of Black Peter.
Unexpected economic events can have massive, disruptive effects on a nation.1 The experience
of crises in the 1990s and 2000s has stimulated researchers’ interest in understanding extreme
events in the US economy. When such events occur, they tend to do so in multiple settings, which
ampliﬁes their impact.2 For example, the collapse of a major lending institution affects many
households, and can cause total insurance claims to increase geometrically, since several classes
are affected, including property loss and job loss.3 Such correlated outcomes are interesting not
only for their practical relevance, but also economically, since they resemble results from a broad
class of theoretical research on herding and strategic complementarities.4
The main goal of this paper is to develop a simple economic framework with rare extreme events,
in order to understand their impact and ramiﬁcations.5 Our model delivers insight into how indi-
viduals respond to extreme events in terms of hedging and asset demands. Interestingly, we ﬁnd
that agents may rationally choose to ignore information about extreme events, if this information
is costly. Such a ﬁnding ties our work closely to research on rational inattention, including Wilson
(1975), Sims (2003), and Veldkamp and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009). There are two other impor-
tant areas of research intersection. First is the recent ﬂurry of work on extreme events, largely
in response to the economic crisis.6 Much of this research analyzes systemic instability.7 Sec-
ond, historically there is a long literature examining ﬁnancial crises and bubbles, in both rational
and behavioral frameworks.8 The quantitative models in most of these research areas focus on
1 For evidence on welfare costs of extreme events, see Chatterjee and Corbae (2007), Barro (2009), and the refer-
ences therein.
2See Barro (2006) and Barro (2009). Also, see Horst and Scheinkman (2006), and Krishnamurthy (2009) for
economic explanations of such ampliﬁcations.
3 For details on insurance during periods of economic disruptions, see Jaffee and Russell (1997); Jaffee (2006);
and Ibragimov,Jaffee, and Walden (2009b).
4 See Wilson (1975); Bikhchandani, Hirschliefer, and Welch (1992); Cooper (1999); and Vives (2008), chapter 6.
5By extreme, we refer to events that have a high impact on the particular system. This impact can be in terms
of ﬁnancial or social cost, or in terms of disruption of equilibrium. By rare, we refer to events that are not observed
frequently, as in Table 1.
6For overviews of the crisis, see Acharya and Richardson (2009); Brunnermeier (2009); Reinhart (2008); and
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
7See Caballero and Krishnamurthy(2008); Ibragimov,Jaffee, and Walden (2009b); Ibragimov,Jaffee, and Walden
(2009a); and Shin (2009).
8 See Fisher (1933);Keynes(1936); Blanchard(1979);Minsky(1982); Friedmanand Laibson(1989);Shleifer and
Vishny(1997);Kindleberger(2000);AbreuandBrunnermeier(2003);Allen andGale (2007);andHong,Scheinkman,
and Xiong (2008).
1a stationary environment. Evidently the economic climate is subject to sudden shifts.9 Despite
the clear policy and academic relevance, little existing research examines the economic impact
of regime shifts in the probability of encountering extreme events. Therefore our research ﬁlls a
much-needed role, by incorporating a simple model of regime shifts in extreme events. We ﬁnd
that the existence of such shifts may help explain the experience of unhedged extreme events in
the US economy, both theoretically and empirically.
Theremainderofthepaperis as follows. In Section 2 wereview theoreticaland empiricalliterature
on extreme events. In Section 3 we develop and calibrate a simple model of risky choice, where
extreme events undergo exogenous regime shifts. Section 4 extends this model to endogenous
extreme events, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Background and related literature
The paper builds on three strands of research, related to extreme events and crises, information
choice, and regime shifts. Regarding extreme events, previous research includes behavioral work
such as Kunreuther and Pauly (2006), who focus on the role of individual myopia in precipitat-
ing catastrophes. It also includes research on bubbles by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), and
Blanchard (1979), among others.10 There is still no consensus modeling approach for analysis of
extremes. A major challenge is that it is unclear how individuals behave towards extreme or low
probability events. Initial evidence by Allais (1953) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggested
that agents overweight low-probability events. However, more recent research has uncovered three
additional results. First, there is evidence that agents underweight low probability events in realis-
tic situations where they must estimate probabilities based on experience, documented by Barron
and Erev (2003), Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and Erev (2005), and Rabin (2002). Second, econo-
metrically there is a bias to under-estimate rare events, examined by King and Zeng (2001), and
de Haan and Sinha (1999). Third, expected utility does not effectively incorporate low probabil-
ities, a phenomenon studied by Bhide (2000) and Chichilnisky (2000). The ﬁnding that agents
may systematically under-estimate low probability events is particularly interesting, and suggests
a systematic lack of knowledge that is not possible to address in current economic frameworks
such as robust control and the theory of ambiguity aversion. These frameworks typically presume
9For empirical research on regime shifts in the economy, see Hamilton (1989); Hamilton and Lin (1996); Ang and
Bekaert (2002); Ang and Bekaert (2004); and Ang and Bekaert (2005). For theoretical modelling of regime shifts, see
Reitz (1988); Evans (1996); Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (2001); and Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2007).
10Other relevant research includes Jaffee (2006); Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden (2009b); and Lorenzoni (2008).
2that agents are aware of their lack of knowledge. By contrast, the most devastating types of rare
events involvesituations where agents are unaware of their lack of knowledge, which we may term
meta-ignorance.11
Regarding information choice, work by Morris and Shin (2002), Sims (2003), Veldkamp and
Wolfers (2007), Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), and Veldkamp and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) shows
that agents do not always use all available information. This approach appeals to costs of in-
formation processing, so that agents choose to ignore potentially valuable, available information.
However, these papers generally do not specify the form and size of costs. The information choice
approach has been able to explain a number of anomalies in economics, including the home bias
puzzle, asymmetric business cycles, portfolio under-diversiﬁcation, and ratings inﬂation. Regard-
ing regime shifts, there is ample evidence that the economic structure of major economic and
ﬁnancial variables is subject to sharp breaks. Hamilton (1989) develops the modern methodology
of regime shifts, and shows its applicability to the macroeconomy. In ﬁnancial markets, evidence
of regime shifts is documented by Hamilton and Lin (1996), Ang and Bekaert (2002), Ang and
Chen (2002), Ang and Bekaert (2004), and Ang and Bekaert (2005). Recent theoretical research
has also examined economic foundations for regime changes, such as Angeletos, Hellwig, and
Pavan (2007). Recent economic experience suggests that an impediment to market performance is
lack of knowledge about how to forecast and hedge extremeevents. This lack of knowledgereﬂects
non-stationarity of the economic environment, which we embed in our model with the device of
regime shifts.
2.1 Contribution of our paper
Our paper contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, we examine extreme events
using a simple well-understood porfolio choice framework, with constant relative risk aversion
and lognormal returns. We therefore obtain stylized facts about the impact of extreme events,
in a transparent, rational setting. Second, based on theoretical and empirical considerations, we
incorporate latent regime switches in the likelihood of extreme events, which may be exogenous
or endogenous. Our paper appears to be the ﬁrst to analyze the economic impact of extreme events
using this framework. Finally, we provide support for the information choice literature of Sims
11 Negative examples of meta-ignorance include the current ﬁnancial market crises of fall 2008, climate change,
impact of new technology and natural catastrophes. See Bazerman and Watkins (2004) and Taleb (2005). Positive
examples could include discovery of North Sea oil in the 1960s.
3(2003) and Veldkamp and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009), since we give evidence on the size of costs
needed to make agents ignore information about important extreme events.
3 Risky choice with exogenous extremes
In this section, we describe risky choice of an individual, faced with rare extreme events. There
are three basic ingredients in our setup. First, the base model features a lognormal distribution
with constant relative aversion (CRRA) utility. This CRRA-lognormal approach is very tractable
and replicates key features of ﬁnancial data. Therefore it is commonly used for macroeconomics,
portfoliochoiceand asset pricing, as in thework ofCampbell (1994), Campbell (1996), and Camp-
bell and Viceira (2002).12 Second, our framework consists of a single representative agent. This
framework allows us to simplify analysis of a situation where large numbers of similar investors
are engaged in risky borrowing, by studying their average behavior.13 The representative agent
approach is typical of modern ﬁnance research in the tradition of Lucas (1978). Third, the case
of rare events is handled by a regime switch approach. Regime switches have been shown to
characterize both economic and ﬁnancial data, by Hamilton (1989) and Hamilton and Lin (1996).
Regime switches are also empirically signiﬁcant in modelling stock market correlations and vari-
ances, as shown by Ang and Chen (2002), Dueker (1997), and Haas, Mittnk, and Paolella (2004).
Moreover, regime switches have been utilized to model rare events in ﬁnance, by Evans (1996))
and Gourieroux and Monfort (2004).
Notation and Calibration. In the remainder of the paper, we will use the following notation.
• The quantity d denotes agents’ demand for risky investment, relative to available wealth;
• Superscript ∗ denotes an optimum;
• Superscript E denotes a decision or wealth level during extreme periods;
• Superscript P denotes a prudent investment or wealth level;
• dP = 1. That is, the prudent investor will invest a maximum of all her wealth in risky investment,
and will not borrow.
12For furtherdetails on the rationale and implementationof the CRRA-lognormal model, see Campbell (1994)page
469; Campbell (1996) page 304; and Campbell and Viceira (2002) Chapter 2. Other textbooks that use this approach
are Huang and Litzenberger (1988) and Lyons (2001).
13The analysis of large numbers of similar investors is also examined by the literature on strategic complementari-
ties, see Cooper (1999).
4• Superscript L denotes a leveraged (excessive) investment or wealth level
• Subscript n denotes an endogenous investment or wealth level;
• Subscript x denotes an exogenous investment or wealth level.
In order to calibrate the various models, we use the following empirical estimates from US data.14
• Annualized excess stock return ˆ µ = 0.081 − 0.009 = 0.072, from Campbell (2003), page 805.
• Annualized stock market volatility σ = 0.156, from Campbell (2003), page 805.
• Annualized average borrowing rate15 r = 0.018;
• Discount factor β = 0.99, from Mehra and Prescott (2003), page 907;
• Risk aversion γ ∈ {1,2,...,10}, from Lewis (1999) page 576; Mehra and Prescott (2003), page 907;
and Mehra and Prescott (1985) page 154;
• Annualized likelihood of an extreme event α = 0.017, from Barro (2006) page 837.
3.1 Excessive investment in a risky asset: A general case
Much of economic research concerns the aggregate effects of excess borrowing for investment, as
discussed by researchers from Fisher (1933) to Allen and Gale (2007). Such excessive borrowing
is often motivated as irrational. While irrationality can certainly drive excess behavior in many
settings, it is valuable to determine whether such behavior may arise in a simple, rational frame-
work. In Proposition 1 we show that such excessive investment is consistent with rational behavior
in a very general setting. Consider a general neoclassical utility function U(W) that depends on
wealth W.16 Among other qualities, this utilityfunction is strictly increasing, bounded, continuous
and concave. Following the approach of Campbell and Viceira (2002), the agent is endowed with
14Other sources for calibrating regime switches include Hamilton (1989), Hamilton and Lin (1996), and Mehra-
Prescott (2003).
15We compute this as the average of the monthly (log) Prime Bank Loan rate, from 1947 to 2009. The Prime Bank
Loan rate is available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
16 By neoclassical utility function, we mean one that is strictly increasing and differentiablycontinuous, as in Allen
and Gale (2007), chapter 2.
5initial wealth W0, and invests a proportion d in a risky asset with returns r = rf +ε. The remainder
is invested in a riskfree asset with returns rf. Thus, W = dW0(1 + r) + (1 − d)W0(1 + rf), or
W = dW0(1 + r
f + ˜ ε) + (1 − d)W0(1 + r
f) (1)
= dW0(1 + r
f) + dW0˜ ε + (1 − d)W0(1 + r
f)
= W0(1 + r
f) + dW0˜ ε
We will use the expression for the objectivefunction in (1) for proving the propositions below. The
agent maximizes utility subject to the wealth constraint, which as a strictly convex program, yields
a unique solution d∗, and unique expected wealth W ∗(d∗). We have the following proposition and
corollary.
Proposition 1 If the investor deviates from the optimal investment strategy d∗ by choosing a sub-
optimal investment strategy ˆ d during a small proportion α of the time, her expected utility loss is
bounded above.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 1 If there are high enough costs to learning whether she is behaving suboptimally a
small proportion α of the time, the investor will rationally choose to continue behaving subopti-
mally.
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 show that for standard expected utility functions, if agents are subop-
timal some of the time and there are costs to detecting extremes, then agents can rationally choose
to be suboptimal. While this insight is valuable, it is important to relate the result to observable
economic parameters. In order to do so, we need to use standard parametric utility functions and
return processes, which we do for the remainder of the paper.
3.2 Base model
We ﬁrst consider a base model of ’typical’ events, where asset returns obey a simplestochasticlaw.
Thedecisionenvironmentconsistsofa singleindividualwithinitialwealth W0, choosingafraction
of wealth d to invest in a risky asset. For these typical economic environments, the investor’s
6problem is straightforward: she maximizes expected utility by choosing the fraction d to invest
in the risky assets. In order to develop the intuition of the previous subsection more concretely,
we utilize an important class of preferences and return processes. In particular, we suppose that
the investor’s preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion over wealth W, U(W) = W 1−γ
1−γ ,
where γ is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion. We also assume that the random terms in risky
asset returns are lognormally distributed,
˜ r ≡ log(1 + ˜ R) ∼ N(µ,σ
2). (2)
These classes of preferences and returns are widely used in ﬁnancial economics, for example
Campbell (1996), and Campbell and Viceira (2002). To solve the investor’s problem, observe
that the expectation of a lognormal variable z satisﬁes log E(z) = E(logz) + 1
2V (logz). Then,










subject to w = r + w0, where w = logW, r = log(1 + R), and w0 = logW0. To evaluate the
above objective function, we therefore must compute the mean and variance of portfolio returns.
The mean excess return is E[r − ff] = d[E(r) − rf] + 1
2d(1 − d)V [r]. The variance of the
portfolio return is d2V [r]. Using equation (2), and standard algebraic manipulation as in Chapter 2






















where ˆ µ = [E(r) − rf]. Taking derivatives yields ﬁrst order conditions ˆ µ + 1
2(1 − 2d)σ2 + (1 −
γ)dσ2 = 0, or d[σ2 − (1 − γ)σ2] = ˆ µ + 1
2σ2. The optimal solution is therefore
d
∗ =
ˆ µ + σ2
2
γσ2 =
2ˆ µ + σ2
2γσ2 . (4)
Equations (3) and (4) represent the basic form of objective function and optimum, which we shall
use throughout the remainder of this paper. Intuitively, the optimal risky investment is increasing
in expected returns and decreasing in risk aversion and variance.
73.3 A model of exogenous extremes
Now we consider the case of rare extreme events. Following the literature on peso problems, we
model this situation as a small-probability regime switch in risky asset returns. Speciﬁcally, the
structure of the problem is unchanged from above, except that the risky return now obeys (2) most
of the time, but a small fraction α of the time, there is a regimeshift to a period of larger tail events:
˜ r ∼ N(µ,σ




), with probability α (Extreme regime),
where α is small.1718 In this subsection, we examine two levels of investor awareness about the
stochastic environment: complete knowledge, and complete misunderstanding.
Agent completely understands the environment First, consider a situation where the individual
knows the stochastic environment. At the very beginning of each period, she knows which regime
prevails, and just solves for the optimal demand in each regime.19 Using the same optimization
approach as before, the optimal demand will now depend on the regime, and is a vector. Now the
investor accounts for the greater variance in the extreme regime, and her optimal investment is a
vector d∗ = (dL,dE). Leverage-friendly times occur with probability 1 − α and extreme periods







2ˆ µ + σ2
2γσ2 , with probability 1 − α (6)
d
E =











, with probability α.
17 In this simple speciﬁcation, the probability of the rare event is inversely proportional to its impact: the lower the
probability, the higher the impact on variance. Therefore it is an easy way to deliver a low probability, high impact
event. This speciﬁcation is similar to that of Gourieroux and Jasiak (2001).
18We might want to compare this to empirical research on the proportionof funds invested in the US, eg Blume and
Friend (1976), Polkovnichenko (2007).
19 The individual does not know the value of risky returns, just the distribution from which they come. Observe that
the mixture of log-normalsis not restrictive on the unconditionaldistribution. Conditionally,each regime satisﬁes log-
normality, but unconditionally, a mixture of normals can approximate most empirically observed return distributions
arbitrarily closely. For more details on normal mixtures, see McLachlan and Peel (2000).
8This is the basic form of investment demand with exogenous extremes in our framework.20
Properties of the Solution We can note two things about the solution in (6). First, dE depends
positively and linearly on the probability α of extremes. Second, for positive excess returns ˆ µ, it is
the case that dL > dE, which is intuitive.21
To glean a quantitative sense of this differential, we calibrate expression (6) to US data, displayed
in Table 1. dL always greatly exceeds dE, as expected. For example, with risk aversion γ = 5,
we ﬁnd that dL = 0.69 and dE = 0.11. Thus the risky demand in extreme times is around 6
times smaller than in typical times. This result is qualitatively intuitive, if we think of the extreme
regimes as high volatility, disaster periods, where most investors hold small amounts of risky
assets, and typical regimes as good or boom periods, when it is relatively more attractive to hold a
large position in risky assets.
We also examine another perspective on investors’ risk positions, since a central part of our paper
concerns the propensity of individuals to spend more than they can reasonably repay.22 In terms
of our model above, the ratio d of individuals’ borrowing to their available, disposable income
increases over time, and is close to 1 or exceeds 1. In order to see whether this situation obtains for
the US economy as a whole, we calculate an empirical version of d in two ways. First, we measure
d as the ratio of total US consumer credit outstanding to available, real disposable income.23 The
results are illustrated in ﬁgure 1. Evidently, this ratio is increasing over time, and has consistently
exceeded unity since July 1986. Second, we measure d as the ratio of total US household credit
market debt to available real disposable income. This quantity is shown in ﬁgure 2. Once again
20To see the third row, note that
d
E =




















2 (1 − α)




21 To see this, observe that the condition for dL > dE can be written, using expression (6), as dL > αdL + 1−α
2γ , or
dL > 1




2γ, which simpliﬁes to 2ˆ µ > 0.
22This propensity is related to the concept of ”over-borrowing,” used by Fisher (1933) in the context of ﬁnancial
crises. For related research on excessive expansion of credit, see Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003); Lorenzoni (2008);
and Shin (2009).
23In order to capture the total amount of income that is available to consumers to repay their borrowing,we subtract
real consumption from real income. We call this quantity available, real disposable income.
9the ratio is increasing, and consistently exceeds unity since 1959. Thus, the historical experience
of the US economy indicates that d has been large and growing throughout the last half century.24
Agent misunderstands the environment In the preceding example, the investor was aware of the
extreme risks she faced. By contrast, some of the most signiﬁcant extreme events in history have
been unknown and unforeseen by the public at large.25 One way to model our ex ante ignorance
about such extremes is to use a hidden regime shift.26 Speciﬁcally, although the true risky return
distribution features a regime shift as in (5), the investor believes that ˜ ε ∼ N(µ,σ2) with prob-
ability 1. Accordingly, she demands d = dL with probability 1, instead of probability 1 − α as
in equation (6). The investor is therefore over-levered α% of the time, investing dL instead of the
optimal dE.
We may ask two important questions about the investor’s behavior. First, how much does this
suboptimal investment hurt her? This question is natural in light of Proposition 1 because the
suboptimality only occurs a small percentage of the time. Second, if there are costs associated
with learning about extremes, would the investor change her suboptimal strategy? We summarize
the answers to these questions in Proposition 2 and Corollary 2, below.
Proposition 2 The cost to investors of suboptimal behavior during extremes is bounded above by







Corollary 2. If the costs of learning about extreme events are above a ﬁnite threshold, the investor
will prefer to over-invest during extreme periods.
24Theoretically, we can also show that dL involves leverage. This means we need to show that dL > 1, or using
deﬁnition (6), this means
ˆ µ+ σ2
2
γσ2 > 1. By positivity of γ and σ2, we can write this as







Given a risk aversion of 2, for example, expression (7) says that leverageis optimal when the Sharpe ratio exceeds 1.5.
25In addition to 2008’s ﬁnancial crisis, other negativeexamples include the Black Death of 1348; the 1929 US stock
market crash; the set of events leading up to the creation of the atomic bomb; global warming; and the devastation of
2005’s Hurricane Katrina. Positive examples include the invention of the wheel; signing of the ﬁrst US copyright law
in 1790; the Wright brothers’ 1903 ﬂight; and the record-breakingUS stock market levels of the 1990s.
26To the best of our knowledge, this formulation of hidden extreme events is novel to the current paper. A parallel
framework is used by Gourieroux and Jasiak (2001), who provide an asset demand application, although they do not
consider hidden regimes, nor endogenous extremes.
10Proof. See Appendix.
Thus,iftherearelargeenoughcoststolearningaboutextremes,theinvestor’sstrategyisinsensitive
to rare extreme events. This is true even when extremes deliver a large effect on return volatility.27
To summarize this subsection, we have shown that in an environment of exogenous extremes, a
knowledgeableinvestorwillinvestmuchmorein normaltimesthanin extremetimes. We havealso
provided a bound on the utility loss from suboptimal behavior by investors who do not understand
the economic environment. The existence of this bound is consistent with the literature on global
games, rational attention and information choice.28 It suggests that even if agents were informed of
the suboptimalityof their investmentstrategy, a high enough level of costs associated with learning
about extremes will prevent them from shifting their strategy.
3.4 Calibration to the US economy
We calibrate Proposition 2 to US data using equation (12) from the Appendix. The results are
displayed in Figure 3. This ﬁgure shows that the costs of excess leverage range from 2% to 6% of
wealth. These costs decrease with risk aversion, since more risk averse investors would have lower
leverage.
4 Risky choice with endogenous extremes
The likelihood of extreme and rare events is affected by the behavior of agents in social settings.
Such endogenous extreme events include the effect of human activity on extreme climate changes,
and the effect of risky borrowing on ﬁnancial crises.29 Accordingly, in this section, we consider a
situation where excessive risky borrowing permanently raises the likelihood of being in the high
variance regime.30 This environment entails more complex information processing for investors,
27The key to this insensitivity may be the combination of regime shifts and CRRA-lognormal framework. Insen-
sitivity of general expected utility functionals to rare events has been examined by Chichilnisky (2000); For related
contexts involving biased perception of virgin risks and fearsome risks, see Chichilnisky (2007); Chichilnisky and
Heal (2003); Pavlov and Wachter (2006); Sunstein and Zeckhauser (2008); and Weber (2006).
28See Morris and Shin (2002)Sims (2003); Skreta and Veldkamp (2009); Veldkampand Van Nieuwerburgh(2009).
29For climate change, see the cover story of Time, March 30, 2007; and Stern (2007). For risky borrowing, see
Grossman (1988), Fisher (1933), and various issues of the Economist in March 2007 and October 2008.
30It is possibleto accountforendogenousregimesin a less draconianway, forexampleif the probabilityof extremes
lowers after a few periods of prudent behavior. The role of excess borrowing in precipitating extreme ﬁnancial market
behavior has been motivated in many ways. One approach emphasizes heightened investor and bank fragility due to
11since their returns depend on the likelihood of extremes, which in turn depends on their investment
strategies. Similar to the literature on information choice of Sims (2003), such processing costs
may lead investors to ignore potentially important information. A further layer of complexity
concerns complete lack of knowledge, when individuals are unaware of their collective impact on
the likelihood of unforeseen extremes.31 In light of these considerations, we formalize endogenous
extremes by considering an investor who believes the risky return comes from a single distribution
as in equation (2), while in truth, the distribution switches endogenously. Optimally the investor
should use a cutoff level for risky investment, as we showed in (6). However, unaware of the
consequences, she follows the approach of (4) and just chooses risky demand equal to dL.
Once more we may ask two questions. First, does this situation harm the investor? In order to
answer this question, we compute the expected wealth from behaving optimally and suboptimally.
Optimal investment involves a cutoff rule, with potentially non-constant d, while suboptimal in-
vestment involves a constant dL. Therefore this situation can in principle hurt the investor if α is
large enough, since the elevated extremes are permanent. Second, under what conditions will she
learn? It turns out that if costs are high enough, there is nothing in the model to alert the investor
to extreme events. Therefore a risk averse individual can ignore endogenous, high-impact regime
shifts.
4.1 A Two-period model
There is a lot of evidence that excessive credit and risky borrowing are related to extreme ﬁnancial
events.32 We summarize this evidence by saying that there are two periods in the economy, with
the consequences of ﬁrst-period investment choices being felt in the second period. In particular,
if the investor is too leveraged in the ﬁrst period, then the likelihood of extremes is increased to
αn in the second period.33 For simplicity, we set αn = 2α. Thus, in this endogenous extreme
lack of liquidity. Prominent examples are the cases of LTCM in 1998 and Lehman Brothers in 2008. Such ﬁrms and
investors are especially susceptible to even small liquidity shocks and margin calls, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
Another approach is taken by the research on bubbles and ﬁnancial crises, see Allen and Gale (2000) and Blanchard
(1979).
31Examplesincludeclimate change,orstock marketbubbles. This class ofextremeeventsis relatedto rare eventsof
Taleb (2005), and oblivious ignorance of Bhide (2000). In geopolitics, an instance of unknown endogenous extremes
could be the set of events in the early cold war that culminated in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. This resembles
a reverse peso problem: by failing to account for their own ignorance, rational individuals do not anticipate extreme
events, which they themselves precipitated.
32See Fisher (1933); Bernanke (1983); (Allen and Gale (2007); Lorenzoni (2008); and Shin (2009).
33For ease of notation, we will use the terms ”prudent” and ”leveraged” to denote an investor who is unlevered and
who is over-levered,respectively. The prudent levels of wealth and investment are denoted by a superscript P, and the
leveraged levels are denoted by a superscript L.
12events model, leverage-friendly times occur with probability 1 − 2α and extreme periods occur
with probability 2α. Using the same approach as in Section 2, the optimal demand vector is
d
L =
2ˆ µ + σ2
















, with probability 2α.
We will use this expression to calculate the effect of endogenous extremes on risky behavior.34
First Period: The ﬁrst period is a typical regime. We assume that the investor’s optimal demand dL
exceeds her wealth, dL > 1. If the investor wishes to be prudent, she can instead invest dP = 1.
Now her investment choice is more involved since she also has to consider credit market effects.
She can invest dP = 1, which has the beneﬁt of ensuring a constant level of extremes and the cost
of foregone returns; or she can borrow to invest dL > 1, which has the beneﬁt of higher possible
returns and the cost of increased danger of extremes.
Second Period: In the second period, the probability of extremes is
Pr(extremes) = α, if investor chose d
P
2α, if investor chose d
L.
The investor is only allowed to borrow for the ﬁrst period, and if so, she repays with interest at
the end of the second period. Therefore, in the second period the investor must choose dP if there
is a typical regime. Thus, depending on the investor’s choices, the economy can evolve along a
path with a low level α of extremes or with a high level 2α of extremes. To determine which
path the investor will choose, we again consider two levels of investor awareness of the economic
environment, corresponding to complete understanding and misunderstanding.
34To see the third row, note that
dE
2α =






2αˆ µ + σ
2
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2 (1 − 2α)




13Agent completely understands the environment In this case, the representative investor under-
stands that the environment features regime shifts in the likelihood of extreme events. Further,
she knows that excess leverage may raise the likelihood of extreme events. We summarize the
investor’s strategy in Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3 There is a net beneﬁt of leverage for investors who know that the environment
features regime-switching in extreme events. This beneﬁt may be expressed as a polynomial in ˆ µ
and σ2.
Proof. See Appendix.
Agent misunderstands the environment In this case, the investor does not know that there are
regime shifts and does not know that she can inﬂuence the likelihood of extremes. In period 1,
she can demand either dL or dP. In period 2, she repays any borrowing, and since she mistakenly
believes that the world is always in the typical regime, she demands the largest fraction she can,
dP = 1. We summarize the results of this investor’s decisions in Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4 The utility loss from following a suboptimal strategy is bounded, for an investor
who does not understand that the environment features regime-switching in extreme events.
Proof. See Appendix.
The import of Proposition 3 is that rational investors will knowingly increase the likelihood of ex-
treme events in the second period. In a related sense, Proposition 4 shows that investorswho do not
understand the environment face losses that are bounded. Therefore if the costs of learning about
the environment are large enough, investors may choose to continue with a suboptimal strategy.
4.2 Calibration to the US economy
We calibrate Propositions 3 and 4 to US data, using expressions for the net beneﬁts and costs from
the Appendix.35 The results are displayed in Figures 4 and 5. From Figure 4 the net beneﬁt of
leverage is always positive. It increases with risk aversion, because in equations 6 and (8), individ-
uals invest more during endogenous than in exogenous extremes. This occurs because the former
feature lower volatility. From Figure 5 we see that the relative beneﬁts from optimal investment
35The expressions for Propositions 3 and 4 are in equations (16), (19) and (20).
14100% of the time versus 100 − α% of the time are low, between 2 and 11 per cent of available
wealth.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we construct a simple latent regime-switching model of portfolio choice, in order to
assess the implications for over-investing. Motivated by theoretical and empirical considerations,
we examine the beneﬁts and costs of leverage, and of suboptimal investment. Our most striking
ﬁnding is that in both one and two-period models, the beneﬁts of sustained optimal investment are
bounded. Thus, investors may knowingly ignore or exacerbate the likelihood of extreme events,
especially if there are costs to learning the structure of the ﬁnancial environment. We also discover
that the beneﬁts of leverage represent a large percentage of income. Upon calibration to the US
economy, we document that the costs of ignoring extreme events are small and the beneﬁts of
leverage are substantial.
Our paper therefore provides both a theoretical framework for examining extreme events, and
empirical evidence on the scope of costs related to learning about extremes. From an academic
perspective, our results may provide support for theoretical research on costs to information pro-
cessing and rational inattention.
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Frequent Rare
Non-Extreme No war, post-1990 ↓ CO2 pollution
(Small Impact) western Europe
Extreme ↑ CO2 Pollution Multi-nation war, post-
(Large Impact) 1990 western Europe
Multi-country stock market
crash, post-Great Depression
Table 2: Risky Asset Demand in Extreme and Normal Times
The table presents risky demand dE and dL during extreme and normal times respectively, using equation












21Figure 1: Consumer Credit Ratio for US Households: 1959-2009
The ﬁgure shows the ratio of total US consumer credit to available income, where the latter is computed as
real disposable income minus real consumption. All variables are available from the Federal Reserve Bank






















Figure 2: Credit Market Debt Ratio for US Consumers: 1953-2009
The ﬁgure shows the ratio of total US household credit market debt to available income, where the latter is
computed as real disposable income minus real consumption. All variables are available from the Federal
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22Figure 3: Investor Costs of Excess Leverage: US Stock Returns
The ﬁgure calibrates the bound from Proposition 2, using US data and the calibration of Section 2. The
bound shows the cost to an investor of excess leverage during rare extreme events. According to Corollary
2 this bound may also be interpreted as the minimum cost of learning about regime shifts in the likelihood
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Figure 4: Net Beneﬁts from Leverage for a US investor
The ﬁgure calibrates the bound from Proposition 3, equation (16). We use US data and the calibration values
described in Section 2 of the text. The bound shows the net beneﬁt from being leveraged during endogenous





































23Figure 5: Beneﬁts from optimal investment for a US investor
The ﬁgure calibrates the bounds from Proposition 4, equations (19) and (20). We use US data and the
calibration values described in Section 2 of the text. The bound shows the net beneﬁt of optimal investment
relative to suboptimal investment during endogenous extreme regimes. This bound may be interpreted as







































24A Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1. If the investor deviates from the optimal investment strategy d∗ by choosing a suboptimal
investment strategy ˆ d during a small proportion α of the time, her expected utility loss is bounded above.
Proof. Weneed to show that the expected utility loss ∆EU satisﬁes ∆EU ≤ K, for some K < ∞.First, let
us denote the suboptimal wealth level ˆ W(ˆ d) Now note that the expected utility loss is the difference between
optimal utility with probability one and with probability 1 − α. Thus ∆EU ≡ U(W∗) − [αU( ˆ W) + (1 −
α)U(W∗)], where we drop the argument in W() for simplicity. Computing the expected utility loss, we
obtain
∆EU ≡ U(W∗) − [αU( ˆ W) + (1 − α)U(W∗)] (9)
= α[U(W∗) − U( ˆ W)].
By boundedness of the utility function, the quantity in (9) is ﬁnite and bounded above, for example, by
αU(W∗). Thus, for K = αU(W∗), we have that ∆EU satisﬁes ∆EU ≤ K, as was to be shown.
Corollary 1. If there are high enough costs to learning whether she is behaving suboptimally a small
proportion α of the time, the investor will rationally choose to continue behaving suboptimally.
Proof. From Proposition 1, we know that the investor loses at most K from investing suboptimally for a
small portion of the time. If we set costs to K, it follows that the investor is better off using the suboptimal
strategy.
Proposition 2. The cost to investors of suboptimal behavior during extremes is bounded above by a constant






Proof. We need to show that the utility loss ∆EU from investing a proportion dL instead of dE during
extreme periods is of the form ∆EU ≤ K, where K = θˆ µ2 for some positive, ﬁnite θ. In order to compute
the utility loss, we just calculate the investor’s objective function (3) in both cases.
Optimal: The optimal strategy is to invest dE, yielding an objective function











































25where the second line uses the fact that dE = αdL + 1−α
2γ , from expression (6).
Suboptimal: In similar fashion, the suboptimal payoff can be calculated as












Now the expected utility loss from suboptimal investment is just the difference between (10) and (11):
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− dL + γ(dL)2
  
.
We can now substitute the expression for dL from equation (6), to obtain











































































(1 − α2)ˆ µ2
γσ4
=
(1 − α2)ˆ µ2
2αγσ2 −
(1 − α)ˆ µ2
γσ2
=
(1 − α2)ˆ µ2 − 2α(1 − α)ˆ µ2
2αγσ2
=
ˆ µ2[1 − α2 − 2α + 2α2]
2αγσ2
=
ˆ µ2[1 − 2α + α2]
2αγσ2
=
ˆ µ2(1 − α)2
2αγσ2 .





, where θ =
(1−α)2
2αγ , as was to be shown.
Corollary 2. If the costs of learning about extreme events are above a threshold, the investor will prefer to
over-invest during extreme periods.
Proof. From the previous proposition, it follows that if costs are above K, the investor will be better off by
over-investing.
Proposition 3. There is a net beneﬁt of leverage for investors who know that the environment features
regime-switching in extreme events. This beneﬁt may be expressed as a polynomial in ˆ µ and σ2.
27Proof. We need to show that for some parameter values, the investor’s objective function from leveraged
investment, PL, exceeds that from prudent investment36, PP. That is, we must show that sometimes PL −
PP > 0.In order todo this, wecalculate the investor’s expected payoff from choosing prudent and leveraged
investment levels. We denote EU as the expected utility, from the objective function in equation (3). The
environment is that the ﬁrst period is always a low-volatility regime with variance σ2. In the ﬁrst period the
investor decides whether to borrow and invest dL, or else invest the prudent amount dP = 1. In the second
period, the investor will choose optimally for that period: either dE (dE
2α) if it is extreme (endogenous), or
else dP for normal economic climates. First we compute the payoff PP as follows37





) + (1 − α)EU(dP|σ2)
 
. (13)
Then we compute the payoff from leverage, PL, as follows. In this case, the investor has to repay borrowing
r(dL − 1)W0 in the second period, where we normalize W0 = 1 to obtain r(dL − 1). Hence the payoff is


















EU(dP|σ2) − EU(r(dL − 1)|σ2)
  
Now to see conditions under which it is optimal to have excessive leverage (excess in the sense that it raises
the likelihood of extremes), we compute PL − PP from (13) and (14) and see when it is positive:

















) + (1 − 2α)EU(r(dL − 1)|σ2)
 
= EU(dL|σ2) − (1 + αβ)EU(dP|σ2) + αβˆ µ
 





r(dL − 1)ˆ µ + (2 − 2α)
σ2
2
r(dL − 1)[(1 − r(dL − 1)) + (1 − γ)r(dL − 1)]
 
,
36 Alternatively,we could phrase it in terms of whether expected borrowingcosts B are beneath a certain threshold.
Then we need to show that the optimal choice is a cutoff
d = dP, if B < ¯ B
= d
L,if B > ¯ B.
37 We show in (7) that dL involves leverage. So in the second period, since it is the end of economic activity, the
agents cannot borrow, they just invest as much as they can, dP = 1.
28where the second and third terms come from substitution into the EU deﬁnition (3) in the following way.
Let us denote the second term S (for second) and the third term T (for third). To see the second term, use
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Now we can substitute in the deﬁnitions of dE and dE
2α from (6) and (8), to obtain
S = βαˆ µ
 















(16α2ˆ µ2 + 8αˆ µσ2 + σ4)
4γ2σ4 + γ
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29Similarly, for the third term in (15), we use expression (3) to obtain
T = 2αEU(r(dL − 1)|
σ2
2α
) + (1 − 2α)EU(r(dL − 1)|σ2)










(1 − γ)(r(dL − 1))2
 
= r(dL − 1)ˆ µ + (2 − 2α)
σ2
2
r(dL − 1)[(1 − r(dL − 1)) + (1 − γ)(r(dL − 1))].
Now we return to computing PL −PP, from expression (15), as follows: First, we use (3) with dP = 1 and
dL to obtain
PL − PP = dLˆ µ +
1
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r(dL − 1)ˆ µ + (2 − 2α)
σ2
2
r(dL − 1)[(1 − r(dL − 1)) + (1 − γ)r(dL − 1)]
 
= dLˆ µ +
1
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r(dL − 1)ˆ µ + (2 − 2α)
σ2
2
r(dL − 1)[1 − γr(dL − 1)]
 
.
Expanding this expression, then collecting terms in dL , (dL)2, ˆ µ, and σ2
2 yields
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3αˆ µ + σ2
2γσ2
 





[−(1 + αβ)(1 − γ) + β(2 − 2α)r + β(2 − 2α)γr2]
= dL
 
ˆ µ(1 − βr) +
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3αˆ µ + σ2
2γσ2 − 1
 





[β(2 − 2α)r(1 + γr) − (1 + αβ)(1 − γ)].
We now remove all terms except the basic parameters ˆ µ, α, γ, σ2, by expressing dL =
2ˆ µ+σ2
2γσ2 as in (6) to
obtain
PL − PP =
2ˆ µ + σ2
2γσ2
 
ˆ µ(1 − βr) +
σ2
2
[1 − β(2 − 2α)r(1 + 2γr)]
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=
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γσ2 [ˆ µ(1 − βr)] +
ˆ µ
2γ




[1 − βr] +
σ2
4γ
[1 − β(2 − 2α)r(1 + 2γr)]
+
ˆ µ2
2γσ2[β(2 − 2α)r2 − 1] +
ˆ µ
2γ
[β(2 − 2α)r2 − 1] +
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[β(2 − 2α)r(1 + γr) − (1 + αβ)(1 − γ)].
Now we collect the terms to obtain the desired polynomial in ˆ µ, ˆ µ2, and σ2 :
PL − PP = ˆ µ
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[β(2 − 2α)r(1 + γr) − (1 + αβ)(1 − γ)]
= ˆ µ
 












































































This expression can be further simpliﬁed for calibration purposes, as
PL − PP = ˆ µ
 















































Finally, we can factor the above expression further in terms of β everywhere to obtain
PL − PP = ˆ µ
 


































Equation (16) is the desired polynomial in ˆ µ and σ2, which represents the net utility gain from following the
leveraged versus the prudent strategy. Upon inspection this quantity can be conﬁrmed as bounded.
Proposition 4. The utility loss from following a suboptimal strategy is bounded, for an investor who does
not understand that the environment features regime-switching in extreme events.
Proof. We have to show that ∆EU ≤ K, for some positive constant K. To do this, we compute the differ-
ence between payoffs to the optimal strategies (PL,PP) and their suboptimal counterparts ( ˆ PL, ˆ PP). That
is, we compute PL − ˆ PL and PL − ˆ PL. Below we ﬁrst compute the optimal, then suboptimal payoffs.
Optimal Payoffs (PL,PP). These are the same as above, in equations (14) and (13):





) + (1 − α)EU(dP|σ2)
 
and

















EU(dP|σ2) − EU(r(dL − 1)|σ2)
  
.
Suboptimal Payoffs ( ˆ PL, ˆ PP). The strategy here involves demanding either dL or dP in period 1 (again de-
pending on parameter values). Then in period 2 the investor repays any borrowing, and since she mistakenly
believes the world is always in the typical regime, she always demands the most she can, dP = 1, regardless
of whether the realized regime is extreme or typical. To compute the results, we proceed as follows. If
she over-invests by choosing dL in the ﬁrst period, the likelihood of extremes raises from α to 2α, and her
payoff ˆ PL is

















EU(dP|σ2) − EU(r(dL − 1)|σ2)
  
.
34Conversely, if she chooses dP in the ﬁrst period, the likelihood of extremes remains unchanged at α and her
payoff ˆ PP is





) + (1 − α)EU(dP|σ2)
 
. (18)
Utility Differentials PL − ˆ PL and PP − ˆ PP. First we compute PL − ˆ PL. Using equations (14) and (17),
we obtain












which from equations (3) and (6) yields




























































We now factor this expression into terms involving ˆ µ and σ2
2 , to obtain
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2γσ2 from (8) yields
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8αˆ µ(2αˆ µ − σ2(2γ − 1)) − σ4[−1 − 4γ(γ − 1)]
 
. (19)
The expression in (19) represents the net utility gain from following the optimal versus the suboptimal
strategy, in the case of leverage. Upon inspection this quantity can be conﬁrmed as bounded.
We now consider the differential between PP and its suboptimal counterpart ˆ PP.
PP − ˆ PP : From equations (13) and (18) we have
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Now we can substitute dE =
2αˆ µ+σ2
2γσ2 from (6) to obtain









2γσ2 − 2αˆ µ − σ2
2γσ2
  



































4αˆ µ(αˆ µ − σ2(2γ − 1)) − σ4(−4γ(γ − 1) − 1)
 
. (20)
The expression in (20) represents the net utility gain from following the optimal versus the suboptimal
strategy, in the case of prudent ﬁrst-period investment. Upon inspection this quantity can be conﬁrmed as
bounded.
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